Abstract: Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatising their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). In an international Cournot mixed oligopoly, we analyse the interaction between privatisation and FDI. We show that privatisation increases incentive for FDI, which in turn, increases the incentive for privatisation compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatisation depends on the efficiency level of the public firm and the foreign firm's mode of entry. We also determine the implications of incentive contracts between owners and managers. Both the incentive for FDI and the optimal degree of privatisation are higher under the incentive contract than under no incentive contract. 
1 Privatisation, strategic foreign direct investment and the host country welfare
Introduction
Two important developments in many developing and transition economies are the privatisation of their state-owned enterprises across several sectors and the significant inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) . Is there any relationship between privatisation and FDI? We ask this question in this paper, and show the relationship between privatisation and FDI.
We show that the privatisation of a public firm in the host country increases the foreign firm's incentive for FDI. We also determine the optimal degree of privatisation that maximises the welfare of the host country. We find that partial privatisation is the optimal strategy. In other words, neither full privatisation nor full nationalisation is optimal for the host country. Furthermore, the possibility of FDI may increase the incentive for a higher amount of privatisation.
Following Barros (1995) , we extend our basic analysis of Cournot oligopoly by incorporating incentive contracts between owners and managers. Under the incentive schemes, the owners of the firms provide incentive schemes to the respective managers who take output decisions to maximise the incentive contracts.
We show that the positive relationship between privatisation and FDI, and partial privatisation as the optimal choice of the host country remain even under the incentive schemes, thus contradicting to Barros (1995) in presence of foreign competition.
However, both the incentive for FDI in presence of privatisation and the optimal degree of privatisation are higher under the incentive scheme than under a Cournot game without the incentive scheme. 1 Privatisation proceeds are defined to include all monetary receipts to the government resulting from partial and full divestitures (via asset sales or sale of shares), concessions, leases, and other arrangements. The data do not cover management contracts, new green field investments, investments committed by new private operators as part of concession agreements, and 'voucher' privatisations (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005) . 2 There is a caveat about figure 1. It should be noted that this figure represents the effect of privatisation and FDI at an aggregate level, and therefore, it is not showing explicitly whether the sectors or the developing countries where privatisation has taken place are also the sectors or the developing countries experiencing higher FDI. However, there is also evidence showing that this in fact be the case. For example, Saha and Sensarma (2003) capture a great deal of information related to privatisation in India's banking sector. 3 Kikeri and Kolo (2005) provide full details on privatisation in developing countries. 
Related literature
The evidence on privatisation and FDI have generated significant but separate literatures on these issues. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to consider the relationship between privatisation and FDI, thus creating a bridge between the literatures on privatisation and FDI.
The seminal works on privatisation by Harris and Wiens (1980) , Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) and Cremer et al. (1989) show how public firm can be used as an effective policy instrument to reduce the inefficiency created in imperfectly competitive markets. The public firm, who maximises social welfare, acts as a disciplining device and helps to obtain the first best allocation of outputs. In contrast, using a model with adverse selection, Rees (1988) suggests that inefficiencies arise with the performance of public enterprise, thus questing the rationale for having public firms.
The works on the incentive for privatisation get momentum with De Fraja and Delbono (1989) , which determine the welfare effects of privatisation in a mixed oligopoly, where a welfare maximising state-owned firm competes with n profit maximising private firms. This shows that privatisation may increase welfare if the marginal costs of production are rising. Anderson et al. (1997) show that while privatisation is harmful in the short run, it can be beneficial in the long run as privatisation attracts new entrants. In contrast, Barros (1995) shows that privatisation is never an optimal strategy if the strategy space of the firms incorporates the possibility of incentive contracts between owners and managers.
While earlier works compare complete privatisation with complete nationalisation, Fershtman (1990) and Matsumura (1998) focus also on partial privatisation. In a mixed duopoly, Fershtman (1990) shows that for any degree of partial privatisation, the profit of the partially nationalised firm is higher than its profit-maximising private competitor. He also suggests that if the public firm is cost inefficient compared to the private competitor, the welfare effect of nationalisation depends on the relative strength between the increase in output and the loss of production inefficiency associated with nationalisation. If the public firm is more cost inefficient than its private competitor, then nationalisation may reduce welfare. In a mixed duopoly, Matsumura (1998) determines the optimal shareholding by the government in a public firm. He shows that complete nationalisation is not an optimal strategy. However, whether partial or full privatisation is optimal depends on the cost difference between the public and the private firms. If the cost of the public firm is sufficiently higher than that of the private firm, then full privatisation is the optimal strategy.
A common feature of these papers is to consider the issue of privatisation in a closed economy. This is inappropriate in economies where significant amount of competition is due to foreign competition. For example, a more recent paper, Maw (2002) , shows evidence of foreign competition faced by partially or completely privatised firms in transition economies. Hence, it is important to see the effects of foreign competition while addressing the issue of privatisation.
The present paper is more close to the recently growing literature on privatisation in open economies where a great deal of competition is due to foreign competition. Fjell and Pal (1996) show that in the presence of a public firm, whether entry of a firm increases welfare of the concerned country is ambiguous and depends on whether the new entrant is a foreign firm or a domestic firm. They also analyse the effects of acquisition of a domestic private firm by foreign nationals on outputs, profits, consumer and welfare. Pal and White (1998) investigate the relationship between privatisation and strategic trade policies such as domestic production subsidies and import tariffs. The paper indicates that when a domestic production subsidy is used, privatisation is always welfare increasing, whereas with import tariffs, welfare only increases provided there are at least two firms in the market and the marginal cost curve for production is not very flat. Liu et al. (2000) show that the reform process that includes both privatisation and trade liberalisation may not be optimal for a centrally planned economy; rather privatisation needs to be accompanied with increasing tariff barriers. Ohori (2004) shows the effects of privatisation on tariff and environmental taxes and shows that privatisation is not beneficial for social welfare. Ohori (2006) considers strategic government policies in an economy where two public firms compete in a third country through exports. He shows that partial privatisation of the state-owned enterprises is the optimal strategy of the respective countries. Fujiwara (2006) shows the interaction between the degree of privatisation and the number of firms in determining short run and long run trade patterns. Chang (2005) and Chao and Yu (2006) extend Matsumura (1998) to international trade, and determine the optimum tariff in the presence of privatisation.
Unlike the above-mentioned papers, Fjell and Heywood (2002) and privatisation on output, profits and welfare. Isibashi et al. (2005) extend the studies by Anderson et al. (1997) to the case with foreign competitors, and show that privatisation is more likely to increase welfare in the long run when the competitors of the public firm are foreign than when they are domestic. However, both these papers ignore the issue of the optimal degree of privatisation. to note that complete privatisation is never optimal for the host country irrespective of the possibility of incentive contracts, and this is in contrast to Matsumura (1998) , where complete privatisation is optimal if the public firm is sufficiently more cost inefficient than the private firm.
The present paper is also related to the vast literature on FDI. While the existing literature on FDI has explained the reasons for the preference for foreign investment compared to other modes of foreign market entry such as exporting, technology licensing, etc., and also uncovered several issues related to FDI, those works have focused on profit maximising private firms, thus ignoring the issue of privatisation. Instead of reviewing the vast literature on FDI, we refer to Pack and Saggi (1997) and Saggi (2002) for recent surveys on FDI.
The Model
We consider a two-country model, which consists of a home country and a host country, and assume that there is one firm in each country. The firms produce a homogenous product. The firm in the home country is a multinational enterprise and is called firm M . Firm M would like to serve the demand in the host country market either by FDI or by exports. The firm in the host country is a public (or state-owned) firm, called firm P .
An important difference between firms M and P is about their objective functions. While the former firm maximises profit, the latter firm maximises a convex combination of profit and social welfare depending on the share distribution between the government and the private owner of the host country. 6 In the following analysis, we will assume that, at the beginning, firm P is fully nationalised, which means that, to start with, the objective function of firm P is to maximise the welfare of the host country.
We consider the following cost structure for the firms. We assume that the constant marginal cost of firm P is p c . The constant marginal costs of firm M under export and FDI are respectively X c and f c , where
x f c c < . For simplicity, we normalise f c to 0 . We assume that firm M is more cost efficient than firm P , with the following relationship between the marginal costs:
. We assume that, under FDI, firm M needs to incur a fixed cost f . 6 In this paper, we consider privatisation as the process of a change in the structure of the public firm. The public firm's share is sold in the private market, reflecting the transfer of the firm's ownership from publicly owned to privately owned or partial privately owned in the case of partial privatisation.
We further assume that the inverse market demand function in the host country is
where the notations have the usual meanings, and
In the next section, we consider the following game. At stage 1, the host country government decides on the level of privatisation, i.e., the fraction of shareholdings of firm P that can be held by the private owners of the host country. At stage 2, firm M decides whether to undertake export of FDI. At stage 3, the firms compete in the product market like Cournot duopolists. We solve the game through backward induction.
The effects of privatisation on FDI incentive and social welfare

Privatisation and FDI incentive
The objective of firm M is to maximise its profits. Therefore, firm M maximises The objective function of firm P will depend on the share distribution between the government and the private owner of the host country. Following the existing literature (e.g., Fershtman, 1990) , we assume that firm P maximises a convex combination of profit and social welfare, where the weights on profits and social welfare are given by the fractions of shareholdings by the private owner and the government of the host country. As a justification for this type of objective function of the public firm, Fershtman (1990) argues that the behaviour of a partly nationalised firm results from a conflict of interest between the directors representing the private owner's interest and the directors representing the government's interest. This conflict of interests is assumed to be resolved through a compromise. Consequently, the firm's output choice is a compromise between output that maximises profits and output that maximises welfare.
So, the objective function of firm P is:
where α indicates the level of privatisation, i.e., the fraction of shareholdings by the private owner. Note that full nationalisation and full privatisation are the special cases of equation (2). If firm P is fully privatised, α becomes one, and if firm P is fully nationalised, α becomes zero. Specifically, the higher the α , the more the privatised firm moves toward a profit maximisation, and the lesser the government holds the remaining share in the privatised firm. Equation (2) can be expanded to:
We assume that the firms choose their outputs like Cournot duopolists to maximise their respective objective functions. As a result, the equilibrium outputs of firms P and M are respectively . Substituting these equilibrium outputs into both firms' objective functions yield the following: Note that under full privatisation, p c must be less than 2 a to ensure a duopoly market structure. We assume that this condition holds throughout the analysis.
Let us now consider the optimal production strategy of firm M . Given the level of privatisation, firm M prefers to undertake FDI than export provided that: The following proposition follows from the above discussion.
Proposition 1: As the degree of privatisation increases, the incentive for FDI increases.
The above result can be explained as follows. If the host country government increases the degree of privatisation in firm P , the objective of firm P moves from welfare maximisation towards profit maximisation. As a result, given the output of firm M , a higher degree of privatisation shifts the reaction function of firm P , and in the new equilibrium, the output of firm M increases, while the output of firm P decreases. Furthermore, the gain in market share by firm M increases with its lower marginal cost of production, which, in turn, implies that a higher degree of privatisation increases the outputs and profits of firm M more under FDI than under export. Hence, the incentive for FDI increases with a higher degree of privatisation. liberalisation, which helps to reduce the trade cost, reduces the incentive for FDI. This is consistent with the well-known "tariff jumping" argument, which states that lower trade costs reduce the incentive for FDI.
Privatisation and host country welfare
The purpose of this section is to find the optimal degree of privatisation by the host country. Since Proposition 1 suggests that a higher degree of privatisation increases the incentive for FDI, i.e., p f is positively related to α , it is immediate that FDI will always occur irrespective of the degree of privatisation if ) 0 ( 
Let us now determine the host country welfare. Given the degree of privatisation, the host country welfare is: 
Case when the foreign firm always undertake FDI
Now, we are in a position to determine the optimal degree of privatisation depending on the plant location strategy of firm M . First, let us consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently small so that ) 0 ( p f f < , i.e., we have the situation (F,F). In this situation, given the degree of privatisation, the host country welfare is: 
Further, differentiating A with respect to p c yields:
which suggests that A is positively related to p c . We also find that: The reason for the above finding can be explained as follows. Since a higher degree of privatisation reduces the weight on welfare maximisation and increases the weight on profit maximisation for the public firm, it tends to lower the consumer surplus by restricting the output of the public firm, thus creating a negative impact on the host country welfare. However, this output reduction by the public firm is being partially compensated by the higher output of the foreign firm, thus reducing the negative impact of lower output by the public firm. Moreover, the lower the marginal cost of the foreign firm compared to the public firm, the lower the effect of consumer surplus loss due to privatisation. There is also another effect of privatisation. A higher degree of privatisation increases the profit of the public firm, thus creating a positive impact on the host country welfare.
If the public firm is (almost) fully nationalised, a significantly higher weight on welfare maximisation induces the public firm to produce a large amount of output.
Hence, a slight amount of privatisation does not have significant negative effects on consumer surplus, while it helps to increase the profit of the public firm. Therefore, if the public firm is (almost) fully nationalised, the effect of higher profit generation due to privatisation dominates the loss of consumer surplus, for any cost difference between the public firm and the foreign firm, thus creating an incentive for privatisation. On the other hand, if the public firm is (almost) fully privatised, the output of the public firm is not very large, and a further reduction of the public firm's output due to privatisation creates a significant negative impact on consumer surplus.
Hence, in this situation, the loss of consumer surplus due to privatisation dominates the effect of higher profit in the public firm, thus reducing the incentive for privatisation. Therefore, for any cost difference between the public firm and the foreign firm, there exists a degree of privatisation that balances the positive effect of higher profit in the public firm and the negative effect of the loss of consumer surplus due to privatisation, and gives us the optimal degree of privatisation. Furthermore, as the cost of the foreign firm compared to the public firm becomes smaller, it reduces the loss of consumer surplus for a given degree of privatisation, thus increasing the incentive for a higher degree of privatisation as the cost of the public firm compared to the foreign firm becomes smaller.
Case when the foreign firm always export
Let us now consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently high so
, and firm M always exports irrespective of the degree of privatisation.
In this situation, the host country welfare is: 
The following shows the relationship between the host country welfare and degree of privatisation. 
We show that: 
< <
).
The intuition for the above result is also similar to that of Proposition 2.
An implication of the above result is that a fall in x c , which may be the outcome of trade liberalisation, will increase the host country government's incentive for privatising its public firm as trade liberalisation increases the cost difference between the public firm and the foreign firm. Hence, trade liberalisation and privatisation may be complementary.
Privatisation attracting FDI
Let us now consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is moderate so that
. In this situation, the foreign firm exports without any amount of privatisation, whereas it may undertake FDI under a suitable degree of privatisation.
Hence, privatisation can induce the foreign firm to switch its production strategy from exporting to FDI. However, it remains to see whether attracting FDI through a privatisation policy is worth for the host country.
From the expressions in equation (6), we find that, given the fixed cost of FDI, there exists a minimum α (say, 1 f α ) such that the foreign firm is indifferent between FDI and exporting at this minimum α , and if α is greater than this minimum α , the foreign firm finds it more profitable to undertake FDI than to export. Furthermore, as the fixed cost of FDI increases, the minimum α that makes the foreign firm indifferent between undertaking FDI and exporting increases. We also find that for a given α , p c and x c , the host country welfare is higher under FDI than under exporting by the foreign firm, but the maximum welfare under exporting is higher than welfare under FDI with complete privatisation.
Depending on the fixed cost of FDI, which determines the minimum α required to attract FDI, the welfare analysis in this subsection can be summarised into three possible cases. Figure 3 shows the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is moderate but sufficiently small so that 1 f α is less than the value of α that maximises the host country welfare under FDI (say, Figure 5 ). In this situation, the optimal degree of privatisation is * x α , which implies that, though there exists a degree of privatisation that can attract FDI, here it is not optimal for the host country to privatise in a way that actually attracts FDI. In summary, the above analysis shows that whether privatisation that brings FDI improves the host country welfare is not clear and depends on the extent of privatisation required to attract FDI. It is possible that W(X,X) is higher than W(X,F) and the host government prefers firm M to export than to undertake FDI. Moreover, we also show that the host government will at least privatise its state-owned firm up to * x α and it will privatise beyond this point only if W(X,F) is higher than W(X,X). In other words, the possibility of attracting FDI increases the incentive for privatisation.
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Whether privatisation that brings FDI improves the host country welfare depends on the extent to which privatisation is required to attract FDI. The possibility of attracting FDI increases the incentive for privatisation. However, if a high level of privatisation is needed to attract FDI, it is possible that such privatisation for FDI is not profitable and the host government prefers the foreign
firm to export than to undertake FDI.
The effects of cost reduction under privatisation
It has been noted that one of the main aims of privatisation is to promote efficiency to the economy and to raise revenue to the state. 8 The high costs of production in the public firms compared to its private competitors may due to the limited provision on the firm's R&D resources and/or managerial slackness. Privatisation may help to correct this inefficiency of the public firm. However, in the above analysis, to show the relationship between the effects of privatisation and FDI in the simplest way, we have so far abstracted away the possibility of public firm's cost reduction due to privatisation.
Recently, Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) show that cost reduction in the domestic firm may reduce a foreign firm's incentive for FDI. Hence, it immediately suggests that if there is cost reduction in the public firm, the net effect of privatisation on FDI depends on the relative strengths of higher private shareholding, which tends to increase market share of the foreign firm, and the cost reduction in the public firm, which tends to reduce market share of the foreign firm. If the cost reduction in the public firm due to privatisation is significantly large, privatisation may reduce the incentive for FDI. In other words, Proposition 1 remains if the cost reduction effect due to privatisation is not very strong.
It should also be immediate that higher cost efficiency in the public firm due to privatisation would increase the incentive for privatisation if the degree of privatisation does not affect the mode of operation of the foreign firm. But, if the degree of privatisation affects the production strategy of the foreign firm, it is not so straightforward whether the cost efficiency in the public firm due to privatisation increases the host government's incentive for privatisation. It depends on the relative strengths of cost reduction in the public firm due to privatisation and the cost change in the foreign firm due to its change of production strategy following privatisation. Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that, in an oligopolistic industry with profit maximising firms, strategic separation of owners and managers, where owners design incentive schemes for managers who take production decisions, may make owners better off compared to the situation where the owners themselves make the production decisions. Barros (1995) extends this literature of incentive delegation to the case of mixed oligopoly, and concludes that full nationalisation is the optimal strategy of the government. However, it is important to note that Barros (1995) focuses on a closed economy.
The effects of the incentive contracts
In this section, we extend Barros's (1995) analysis to an open economy, where a foreign firm decides on FDI and exporting, by introducing incentive delegation in our above analysis, and show that the main conclusion of Barros (1995) , i.e., no privatisation is the optimal strategy of the government, does not hold when the public firm faces competition mainly from a foreign private firm. The analysis of this section also helps us to show the robustness of our analysis of the previous section to a wider strategy space of the firms.
We consider the following game in this section. At stage one, the host country government decides the degree of privatisation. At stage two, the public firm decides whether to undertake FDI or export. 9 At stage three, owners of the public and the foreign firms design the incentive contracts for their managers. At stage four, the managers choose the optimal outputs of the firms that maximise the incentive schemes given to them. We solve the game through backward induction.
Privatisation and the incentive for FDI
Under the incentive contract regime, each owner offers his manager a contract that is a linear combination of profit and revenue, i.e.,
where i M is the incentive contract delegated by owner i to its manager, and i π and i R denote the profit and revenue of firm i respectively. Equation (17) expands to
Given i λ , the Cournot reaction function for manager i is Similar to section 4, the objective functions of firms M (the foreign firm) and P (the public firm) are given by equations (1) and (2) 
Privatisation and social welfare
Let us now consider the relationship between privatisation and the host country welfare under the incentive contract. The expression below describes the host country welfare for a given degree of privatisation: Since the proofs of the above results are similar to the results shown in section 4, we show the formal calculations for Propositions 7(i) and 7(ii) in Appendix B. The proof of Proposition 7(iii) is similar to the analysis of subsection 4.2.3, and we skip this analysis here to avoid repetition.
It is worth mentioning that, while Barros (1995) , concludes that, in presence of incentive contracts, the government should not privatise the public firm, we show that this result does not hold in an open economy with foreign competition. In case of foreign competition, we show that partial privatisation is always the optimal strategy of the host country government even under incentive contracts.
The effect of privatisation under the Cournot game vs. the incentive contract
Let us now compare the effects of privatisation on the incentive for FDI and the host country welfare under the incentive scheme regime and the no incentive scheme. The incentive contract regime helps the foreign firm to gain higher market share compared to the situation with no incentive scheme. However, this benefit from higher output is higher under FDI since it helps to reduce the distortion from a higher cost associated with exporting. Therefore, the firm has a higher incentive to do FDI under the incentive contract regime than no incentive contract.
Looking at the welfare analysis under the two different regimes we find that, although both regimes provide the same qualitative conclusion, for a given α , welfare is higher under the incentive contract regime than under no incentive contract regime. Hence, the degree of partial privatisation needed for maximum welfare may differ between these two regimes. We show in Appendix C that * * NIC IC α α > , i.e., the degree of privatisation is higher under the incentive contract regime than the no incentive contract regime. This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 9:
At any given p c , the optimal level of privatisation under the incentive scheme regime is higher than that under the no incentive scheme regime.
Conclusion
Though privatisation by many developing and transitional economies and inflows of FDI in developing countries are two important focuses in the contemporary world, the existing theoretical literature has failed to capture both these aspects together. We take up this issue in this paper, and show the interaction between privatisation and FDI.
We show that privatisation increases the incentive for FDI. However, whether a country would prefer to privatise up to a point that attracts FDI is ambiguous. If the degree of privatisation that is required to attract FDI is sufficiently high, the host country does not find it beneficial to attract FDI through privatisation; rather it will privatise up to the point at which the host country welfare is maximum under export by the foreign firm. We show that whether or not the degree of privatisation affects the mode of production of the foreign firm, partial privatisation is the optimal strategy of the host country. The cost difference between the domestic public firm and the foreign private firm is also important to determine the degree of privatisation. So, the cost difference between the firms as well as the effect of privatisation on the foreign firm's production strategy, both play important roles in determining the privatisation policy. Our main conclusions are robust with respect to the incentive delegation within firms.
There is, however, an important remark that needs to be made. So far, we have focused on the effect of privatisation on the foreign firm's production strategy but abstracted our analysis from entry of the host country firms. Privatisation may attract new entry of the host country firms by reducing the output of the public firm, thus leaving more residual market to the potential domestic firms. Higher competition in the host country market due to the domestic firms' entry reduces the residual demand for the foreign firm and may adversely affect the foreign firm's incentive to undertake FDI. Hence, the effects of entry of the domestic firms on the incentive to undertake FDI due to privatisation and the corresponding welfare implications will be similar to the effects of cost reduction in the public firm. 
